Trust negotiation is an authorizing technique based on digital credentials, in which both a user and a server gradually establish trust in each other by repeatedly exchanging their credentials. A trust negotiation strategy is a function that answers a set of credentials to disclose to the other party, depending on policies and the set of already disclosed credentials. The disclosure tree strategy (DTS), proposed by Yu et al., is one of the strategies that satisfies preferable properties. DTS in a simple implementation requires exponential time and space; however, neither an efficient algorithm nor the lower-bound of its complexity was known. In this paper, we investigate the computational complexity of DTS. We formulate subproblems of DTS as problems on derivation trees of a context-free grammar (CFG), and analyze the computational complexity of the subproblems using the concepts of CFGs. As a result, we show that two subproblems evl and mset of DTS are NP-complete and NP-hard, respectively, while both are solvable in polynomial time if we modify evl not to require non-redundancy and mset not to answer any subset useless for leading the negotiation to success.
Introduction
Trust management [1] - [4] , that is an authorizing technique based on digital credentials and policy specification, is a promising technology for modern network applications in which all potential users are not known in advance. In a trust management system, an administrator specifies a policy such as "If a user has a credential issued by company A, then provide service R to the user" beforehand, and the system decides whether or not a user should be provided with a service based on the policies and the credentials that the user presents. Digitally signed credentials guarantee the holders' attributes, and using them the system can provide an appropriate authorization to a user without a prior-registered user ID or password information.
Trust negotiation [5] - [9] is one of the approaches to trust management, in which both a user and a server gradually establish trust in each other by repeatedly exchanging their credentials. In contrast to a usual trust management system where a user should know and trust the server at the beginning of a transaction, trust negotiation supports trust establishment between strangers. negotiation in this example is performed by Bob, an employee of Company F, and Company A. Both parties have their own set of credentials, policies, and services. Assume that Bob starts the negotiation by requesting a special discount (denoted by R) from A ( Fig. 1 (1) ). Then, since A has a policy that A provides the service R only for an employee of Company F, A asks Bob to disclose a credential that guarantees Bob is an employee of F ( Fig. 1 (2) ). Though Bob can prove himself to be an employee of F by disclosing his employee ID B 1 , his policy P B1 permits disclosing it only to a partner company of F. Hence, he asks A to disclose a credential that guarantees A is a partner of F ( Fig. 1 (3) ). A discloses its credential A 1 for proving itself to be a partner of F ( Fig. 1 (4) ). Then Bob discloses his employee ID since the policy P B1 is satisfied ( Fig. 1 (5) ). Finally, A provides the discount for Bob, and the negotiation ends successfully ( Fig. 1 (6) ). We consider a transaction between two parties: a user and a server. Each party has its own set of credentials as well as its own policies. A policy is a rule of the form A ← B 1 ∧ . . . ∧ B n , which means "credential (or service) A can be disclosed (or provided) to the other party if he/she has disclosed B 1 , . . . , B n ." If a service requested by the user is protected by the server's policy, then the server sends back the policy for the service to the user, which is considered to be a request for the credentials in the right-hand side of the policy. Both parties repeatedly send credentials and/or policies to the other party in turn. The transaction ends either when the user obtains the requested service or when any of the parties cannot make the negotiation progress, i.e., the negotiation fails. 
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A trust negotiation strategy (of a party i) is a function that answers a set of credentials to disclose to the other party, depending on the policies and credentials of the party i and those disclosed by the other party. Yu et al. [10] proposed a set of strategies, the DT family, and showed that it satisfies preferable properties: If each party chooses his/her strategy among the DT family, then (1) a negotiation between the parties always terminates, and (2) whenever there exists a disclosure sequence obeying the policies of the two parties to obtain a requested service, the negotiation will end by the requester obtaining the service. The disclosure tree strategy (DTS) is the most cautious strategy in the DT family; that is, it discloses the minimal information to the other party to evolve the negotiation. DTS in a simple implementation requires exponential time and space; however, neither an efficient algorithm nor the lower-bound of its complexity was known.
In this paper, we investigate the computational complexity of DTS. DTS is defined in terms of a set of trees, called disclosure trees, which represent the dependency relation among credentials defined by disclosed policies. For example, if a policy A ← B 1 ∧ . . . ∧ B n has been disclosed, then each node labeled with A has children labeled with B 1 , . . . , B n . Considering policies to be the productions of a context-free grammar (CFG), we can formulate the subproblems of DTS as problems on derivation trees of the CFG. Since the other subproblems of DTS are trivial, this paper mainly concerns the following two subproblems:
• evl: Decide whether there exists a non-redundant disclosure tree with a leaf labeled with some credential of the other party. A disclosure tree is redundant if there exists a path from the root to a leaf that has two or more nodes with the same label.
• mset: Find a minimal subset of credentials and policies that makes the set of disclosure trees evolvable for the other party. A set of disclosure trees is evolvable for one party U if it contains a tree with a leaf labeled with a credential concerned with U.
We show that the evl is NP-complete and mset is NP-hard, while both are solvable in polynomial time if we modify evl not to require non-redundancy and mset not to answer any subset useless for leading the negotiation to success.
Trust Negotiation and Disclosure Tree Strategy

Access Control Policy
A credential is a digital document that guarantees a subject's attributes and is digitally signed by a trusted party. In this paper, we assume that each credential is concerned with exactly one subject. We say that C is a credential of a party i if C's subject is i. As far as a trust negotiation is concerned, the difference between a service and a credential is that a service does not occur in the right-hand side of a policy. So we treat a service as a special case of a credential in the following definitions. An access control scheme of a party i is a pair (C i , P i ) where C i is a finite set of credentials of i and P i is a finite set of access control policies (or policies for short) defined below. For each credential C ∈ C i , an access control policy, denoted by p(C), is associated, and
Definition 1.
A policy is a logical expression of the form C ← e where e is either true or a disjunction of conjunctions of credentials, or ¬C. If C is a credential of party i, then the subject of each credential in e should be different from i.
The following are sample policies:
In the right-hand side of a policy, a credential is used as a propositional symbol that is true if the credential has been disclosed by its subject. For example, the first of the above policies means that providing R to the other party is allowed if B 1 and B 2 have been disclosed or B 3 or B 4 has been disclosed. If the right-hand side of a credential's policy is satisfied by a set C of currently disclosed credentials (including the case that the right-hand side is true), then we say the credential is unlocked by C.
Definition 2.
A credential X is unlocked by a set C of credentials, denoted as C | = X, if and only if p(X) = X ← e where e = true or there exists a conjunction
A policy of the form ¬C is called a denial policy, which means that the subject of C does not possess the credential or does not want to disclose the credential in any situation. A policy that is not a denial policy is called a permission policy.
Trust Negotiation
A trust negotiation is performed by two parties: a server (service provider) and a user (service requester). In the following, we fix the parties and call the former Alice and the latter Bob. The access control schemes of Alice and Bob are also fixed. We also fix a service R that Bob requests. A negotiation begins when Bob requests Alice to provide R. Then, Alice performs one of the following actions:
(1) Provide R if R is unlocked; (2) Disclose a subset of Alice's unlocked credentials and/or a subset of Alice's policies; or (3) Quit the negotiation.
If Alice chooses (2), then next Bob performs (2) or (3). And then Alice and Bob alternately perform one of the above actions. The negotiation terminates when R is provided to Bob or when one of the parties quits the negotiation. As a result of each action, a message, which is either a subset of credentials and policies or a notice of quitting a negotiation, is sent to the other party.
A negotiation strategy (or strategy for short) is a mapping σ that takes an access control scheme (C, P) and a set D of already disclosed credentials and policies as input and answers a message, i.e., credentials and policies to disclose to the other party (or a notice of quitting). Let (C A , P A ) (resp. (C B , P B )) be the access control scheme of Alice (resp. Bob). A trust negotiation between Alice and Bob (starting from Bob) is formally a (finite or infinite) sequence of messages:
where Req R represents the request for R and each message m i, j (i ∈ {A, B}, j ≥ 0) consists of policies and unlocked credentials. If the sequence is finite, then the last message is either {R} or Quit. Let D j ( j ≥ 0) be the set of policies and credentials already disclosed up to point j; i.e.,
Let σ A (resp. σ B ) be the negotiation strategy of Alice (resp. Bob). The trust negotiation obeying σ A and σ B is the one that satisfies
If the two parties of a negotiation use arbitrary strategies, then the negotiation does not necessarily terminate. However, if each party chooses a strategy (that can be different from the other party's strategy) in a family of strategies called the DT family † [10] , then the following good properties hold:
• Negotiations always terminate.
• Whenever there exists a disclosure sequence obeying the policies of the two parties to obtain a requested service, the negotiation will end by the requester obtaining the service.
The Disclosure Tree Strategy (DTS) [10] , reviewed in the following subsections, is the most cautious strategy in the DT family; i.e., it discloses the least number of credentials. However, a simple implementation of the DTS requires exponential time and space, and it is not known whether or not there exists an efficient implementation of the DTS. This paper aims to investigate the computational complexity of the DTS.
Disclosure Tree
A disclosure tree is a tree structure that represents the dependency among credentials defined by a given subset of policies and credentials. For example, Fig. 2 shows the set of disclosure trees for a set {R ← (B 1 ∧B 2 )∨B 3 , B 1 ← A 1 ∧A 2 } of policies. Note that by Definition 1, the right-hand side of the policy p(A) of Alice's credential A only contains Bob's credentials (and vice versa).
Definition 3.
A disclosure tree for a set P of permission policies, a set P d of denial policies, and a set C of credentials is a finite, labeled, unordered tree that satisfies the following conditions:
• Each node is labeled with a credential's name. • The label of the root is R.
• Each node u and u's label A satisfy the following: -A C; i.e., A has not been disclosed yet.
In other words, the set of the labels of u's children equals the set of the credentials that are requested by A's policy and that have not been disclosed.
Note that the original definition [10] allows the label of an internal node to be unlocked. We restrict unlocked credentials to labels of leaves because permitting an unlocked node to have children of another disjunction is useless and the results given in the rest of this paper do not depend on this restriction.
We say a disclosure tree t is redundant if there exists a path in t from the root to a leaf that contains more than one node with the same label. We write the set of all (redundant and non-redundant) disclosure trees for D = P ∪ P d ∪ C as view r (D) and the set of non-redundant disclosure trees as view nr (D).
Definition 4.
If a credential A of a party U is the label of a leaf of a disclosure tree in view
The DTS is a strategy that selects a minimal subset m of credentials and policies to disclose so that view nr (D ∪ m), the set of disclosure trees in the next state, will be evolvable for the other party.
Yu et al. [10] only concerned view nr (D) because of the following reason. For example, let
where R, A 1 , and A 2 are Alice's credentials and B 1 and B 2 are Bob's ones. Figure 3 shows some of the disclosure trees in view r (D). Disclosing either B 2 or p(B 2 ) is not necessary for making R be unlocked, because Bob has to disclose B 1 in any way and disclosing B 1 immediately unlocks R. In this sense, it is better to ignore redundant disclosure trees when selecting credentials and policies † Although Yu et al. named the family the DTS family, we call it the DT family for distinguishability from DTS. to disclose. However, the complexity of deciding whether view nr (D) is evolvable for given D is NP-complete (Theorem 1), while we can decide whether view r (D) is evolvable in linear time (Proposition 2). Hence we define R-DTS, the same strategy as DTS except that it is based on view r (D), and investigate the complexity of DTS and R-DTS.
Context-Free Grammar for Representing Disclosure Trees
We can consider given permission policies to be productions of a context-free grammar (CFG) and disclosure trees to be derivation trees of the CFG.
Definition 5. For a subset P of permission policies, a subset P d of denial policies, and a subset C of credentials, we define CFG G(D) for D = P ∪ P d ∪ C as follows:
• The set of productions of G(D) is the smallest set that satisfies the following: If A is a non-terminal symbol such that p(A) ∈ P and there exists a conjunction B 1 ∧ . . . ∧ B k in the right-hand side of p(A) and Obviously, a tree t is a derivation tree of G(D) if and only if t is a disclosure tree of view r (D), if we consider t to be an unordered tree. Using this CFG representation, we can reduce problems about the set of disclosure trees to problems about CFG. For example, we can decide whether view
Disclosure Tree Strategy
The DTS in Alice's turn is a mapping defined by the following input and output:
Input: • (C A , P A ): the access control scheme of Alice.
• D: the set of credentials and policies disclosed by any of the parties so far. Note that R, the goal of Bob, is in C A . For (C A , P A ) and D, we let LP A = P A \ D (the set of Alice's undisclosed policies) and (1) to (3). The notice of quitting the negotiation is denoted by Quit.
(
The DTS in Bob's turn is defined in a similar way. R-DTS is the strategy obtained from DTS by replacing view nr with view r .
Although the original DTS defined in [10] answers the set of all non-empty minimal m such that view nr (D ∪ m) is evolvable for Bob (and Alice can arbitrarily choose any one message in the set), the number of such m's can be exponential to the description length of D ∪ C A ∪ P A . To make discussions on complexity simple, we modified the DTS so that it outputs only one message.
Consider (1), (2), and (3) in the output of DTS above. As mentioned in Sect. 2.4, (1a) deciding whether view r (D ∪ P A ) = ∅ (and view nr (D ∪ P A ) = ∅) can be reduced to the emptiness test of context-free languages, which is solvable in linear time. (2) Deciding whether R is unlocked is easy. Hence, the main problems for solving the DTS (resp. R-DTS) are: (1b) deciding whether view nr (D) (resp. view r (D)) is evolvable for Alice and (3) computing one arbitrary minimal m such that view
We call the former evl (which is a decision problem) and the latter mset (which is a function problem). We prefix nr-(resp. r-) to the names of these problems to indicate that view nr (resp. view r ) is used in their definitions. In the next section we investigate the complexity of these problems.
NP-Hardness of DTS Theorem 1. nr-evl is NP-complete.
Proof. Solving nr-evl is equivalent to finding a nonredundant derivation tree of G(D) with a leaf labeled with a credential of Alice. This problem is in NP because it is solvable by the following non-deterministic polynomial time algorithm: Guess a sequence
A is a non-terminal symbol that does not appear in the left-hand side of any production; i.e., A is a useless symbol.
where C 0 = R, C k is a credential of Alice, and no symbol appears twice or more. Then, check the following:
for some α and β. Moreover, for each non-terminal symbol C in αβ, there exists a derivation, which does not include any of C 0 , C 1 , . . . , C i , from C to some string of terminal symbols.
NP-hardness can be shown by a transformation from 3sat as follows: Let U = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m } be the set of variables and W = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n } be the set of clauses of an arbitrary instance of 3sat. Assume that c j = {l j1 , l j2 , l j3 } for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Let D be the set of the following policies:
The label of a leaf of a disclosure tree should be either A 0 (a credential of Alice) or B 0 (a credential of Bob). Every disclosure tree with a leaf labeled with A 0 consists of a single path from R to A 1 and a subtree rooted at A 1 (see Fig. 4 ). Note that by constructing and storing some data structure related to view nr (D) at the end of each step, Alice may be able to reduce computation time for her next turn. However, even doing so, Alice cannot solve every step for D in the proof of Theorem 1 in polynomial time, unless P = NP. Proposition 2. r-evl is solvable in O(n) time, where n is the description length of D.
Proof. We can decide whether view r (D) is evolvable for Alice by testing whether L (G(D) ) contains a string of terminal symbols that contains at least one of Alice's credentials. This test can be achieved by testing whether the intersection of L (G(D) ) and a regular language R A , which is the set of all the strings that contains at least one of Alice's credentials, is empty. This emptiness test can be performed in O(nm 3 ) time, where m is the number of states of a finite automaton that recognizes R A . Since R A can be recognized by a finite automaton with two states, this proposition holds. Now we consider an upper bound of the complexity of r-and nr-mset. For a class X of problems, let NP X be the class of problems solvable by a polynomial-time nondeterministic oracle Turing machine (PT-NOTM) with oracle for a problem in X.
Corollary 5. r-mset is in NP
NP and nr-mset is in NP 
NP-hard in NP
NP
Note that in the proof of NP-hardness of r-mset (Theorem 3), we do not depend on minimality of the solution m of r-mset. We think that the minimality condition imposes higher complexity than NP on r-mset. Since NP-hardness of nr-mset (Theorem 4) can be proved by the same proof of Theorem 3, we think the complexity of nr-mset is also higher than NP. Improving the lower bound of the complexity of r-and nr-mset is future work.
Polynomial Solvability under Practical Assumptions
In this section, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for rmset under the following practical modification on the definition of mset:
Monotonicity: In the definition of r-mset (resp. nr-mset), the output m should be a minimal non-empty subset of
We denote r-mset (resp. nr-mset) under monotonicity as mr-mset (resp. m-nr-mset). M-R-DTS is the strategy obtained from R-DTS by replacing r-mset with m-r-mset.
As shown in the following example, any solution m of r-mset (or nr-mset) that does not satisfy monotonicity is useless for unlocking R. In this sense, excluding solutions that do not satisfy monotonicity is practical.
Example 1. Let
In the definition of r-mset in the previous section, m = {A 1 ← B 4 } is a correct solution; however, it is not a solution under monotonicity, since in view r (D ∪ {A 1 ← B 4 , A 2 ← B 2 }), there no longer exists a disclosure tree with a leaf labeled with Bob's credential due to the policies B 2 ← A 2 and A 2 ← B 2 (see Fig. 5 ). (Each disclosure tree should be finite by Definition 3, and thus the above cyclic policies eliminate trees containing B 4 .) Such m is not useful for unlocking R, since the effect of the disclosure of m will finally be canceled by the disclosure of other policies. 1. We first show that under monotonicity, it is sufficient to consider disclosure trees without a label that is "useless" in view r (D ∪ LP A ) (Lemma 7). The concept of uselessness is borrowed from that of CFGs. 2. We define UReq(B) as the family of minimal subsets of credentials that unlock B. We also define the reachability graph where nodes are credentials and an edge (x, y) means that x can reach y via an undisclosed policy followed by a path consisting of already disclosed policies. 3. By the reachability graph, we characterize a minimal set that Alice needs to disclose for constructing a tree evolvable for Bob by "connecting" already disclosed credentials and policies (Lemmas 8 and 9).
Example 2. Let
At first we define some additional concepts. We fix (C A In a CFG, a symbol Y is reachable from a non-terminal symbol X if αYβ can be derived from X for some α and β. X is generating if some string of terminal symbols can be derived from X. Let UL be the set of symbols in G(D ∪ LP A ) that are either non-generating or unreachable from R. In other words, UL is the set of useless symbols; i.e., any disclosure tree in view r (D ∪ LP A ) does not contain any symbol in UL as a label. The following lemma says that under monotonicity, it is sufficient to consider disclosure trees without symbols in UL. Proof of Lemma 7 is given in Sect. A.2. Using Lemma 7, we would like to find m such that view r (D ∪ m) contains a disclosure tree without symbols in UL and with a leaf labeled with a credential of Bob. To do so, we have to find undisclosed policies that "connect" already disclosed policies and make a path from R to some B 0 such that UReq(B 0 ) ∅ (see Fig. 7 ). To characterize a sequence p (A 1 ) , . . . , p(A n ) of policies to disclose for constructing a path from R to B 0 , below we define a directed graph called a reachability graph. Intuitively, the reachability graph has an edge (x, y) if y is reachable (only using productions without symbols in UL) from x when p(x) is disclosed (Fig. 8) .
Let G U be the CFG obtained from G(D) by removing the productions that contains one or more elements of UL. Thus each derivation tree of G U represents a disclosure tree under D without symbols in UL. We define the reachability graph (V, E) of D as a directed graph as follows:
• Let v 0 be a new symbol, V A be the set of the left-hand sides of the policies in LP A , and V B be the set of Bob's credentials. We define
• E is the smallest set that satisfies the following:
there is a credential B such that (1) the right-hand side of p(x) contains a conjunction that contains B and does not contain any element of UL and (2) y is reachable from B in G U .
By the definition of E, each vertex in V B has no outgoing edge. For each x ∈ V A , (x, y) ∈ E for some y if and only if y becomes reachable from x, only using productions without symbols in UL, when p(x) is disclosed. For convenience, we define 
Proof. By Lemma 7, view r (D ∪ m) contains a disclosure tree t without symbols in UL and with a leaf u labeled with a credential B of Bob. Let v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n be the credentials in V A that appear in this order on the path in t from the root to u. By the definition of E,
for some i and j such that 0 ≤ i and i + 2 ≤ j ≤ n, then there exists a disclosure tree in view r (D ∪ m) with a leaf u labeled with B such that the credentials in V A that appear on the path from the root to u are v 1 , . . . , v i , v j , . . . , v n . Since we can choose this tree as t, we can assume that (v i , v j ) E for 0 ≤ i and i + 2 ≤ j ≤ n. Let The DT family is defined as {σ | DTS σ}, i.e., the set of strategies such that DTS is at least as cautious as them.
As shown in Example 2, DTS R-DTS since an answer of R-DTS (or its subset) is not an answer of DTS. DTS M-R-DTS for the same reason. Thus either R-DTS or M-R-DTS is not in the DT family, and the properties of the DT family described in Sect. 2.2 do not necessarily hold if one party uses R-DTS or M-R-DTS and the other uses a strategy of the DT family. However, we can define another family of strategies, R-DT family, as {σ | R-DTS σ}. The R-DT family contains R-DTS and M-R-DTS, and if each party chooses a strategy in the family, then the same properties as the DT family hold.
Note that R-DTS M-R-DTS since if m is an answer of M-R-DTS, then m is also an answer of R-DTS or otherwise a non-empty subset of m is an answer of R-DTS. On the other hand, M-R-DTS R-DTS as shown in Example 2. Thus we can say R-DTS is more cautious than M-R-DTS. However, as shown in Example 1, R-DTS (and DTS) may answer a message useless for unlocking R, and thus cautiousness does not mean that each message only contains useful policies for unlocking R.
Relation among DTS, Formal Language Theory, and Propositional Logic
Using the terminology in formal language theory, nr-evl is equivalent to the following problem:
INPUT: a CFG G and a subset Σ A of terminal symbols of G. OUTPUT: Does there exist a non-redundant derivation tree containing a symbol in Σ A ?
We showed this problem is NP-complete (Theorem 1). revl is a variation of nr-evl that does not require nonredundancy and can be reduced to the emptiness problem of CFG (Theorem 2). Similarly, (an essential part of) nr-mset can be rephrased as follows:
where N is the set of nonterminal symbols, Σ is the set of terminal symbols, P 1 is the set of productions, and S is the start symbol, and another set P 2 of productions over N and Σ such that P 1 ∩ P 2 = ∅, and a subset Σ B ⊆ Σ. OUTPUT: a minimal non-empty subset m of P 2 such that G = (N, Σ, P 1 ∪ m, S ) has a non-redundant derivation tree containing a symbol in Σ B .
r-mset is a variation of nr-mset obtained by removing the word 'non-redundant.' Both nr-and r-mset are NP-hard. For nr-evl, the authors could not find any similar problem in literature on formal language theory and complexity [11] - [13] or on regular tree languages [14] . (Note that the set of derivation trees of a CFG can be seen as a regular tree language.) It seems that in formal language theory, a problem such as nr-evl in which non-redundant trees are important is rare.
Similarly, for nr-and r-mset, there is no similar result in literature on propositional logic [15] . Since policies are defined as propositional formulae and disclosure trees are similar to proof trees, these problems seem to be related to propositional logic. However, while most studies on propositional logic concern algorithms and complexity for deciding satisfiability of formulae, nr-and r-mset do not concern satisfiability. mset can be rephrased as follows using the terminology of propositional logic:
INPUT: two set P A , P B of propositional formulae. OUTPUT: Suppose that parties A and B possess P A and P B , respectively, and they add a subset of his/her formulae to a proof tree in turn. The question is to find a minimal subset of formulae that prevent the other party from reaching deadlock.
This problem seems to be a problem in game theory rather than propositional logic. However, mset is different from a typical problem in game theory such as finding a move that force the other party into deadlock.
Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed the computational complexity of a trust negotiation strategy called DTS. We formulated subproblems of DTS as problems on derivation trees of a context-free grammar (CFG), and analyzed the computational complexity of the subproblems using the concepts of CFGs. As a result, we showed that the original DTS is NPhard while it is polynomially solvable if we modify it to prohibit any useless disclosure for leading the negotiation to success. Improving the gap between the lower and upper bound of the complexity is future work. Future work also includes the analysis of trust negotiation strategies from a point of view other than computational complexity, e.g., the number of credentials disclosed in one negotiation, the number of actions required for one negotiation, and so on.
Appendix: Proof of Theorems and Lemmas
A.1 Proof of Theorems 3 and 4
Proof of Theorem 3. We show the NP-hardness by a transformation from 3sat. Let (U, W) be an arbitrary instance of 3sat where U = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n } be the set of variables and W = {c 1 , c 2 
For these D and LP A , Alice should have no unlocked credentials; i.e., LC A = ∅.
For example, consider a sample instance of 3sat in which n = 3 and W = { {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 }, {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 }, {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } }. Proof of Theorem 4. In this proof, we exchange the roles of Alice and Bob; i.e., we assume that Bob is performing DTS to select m. 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 7
At first we show the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 12.
Let m be a subset of LP A ∪ LC A .
(1) If X is reachable from R in G(D ∪ m), then X is reach-
